Irresponsible Government


Chapter 3 Opposition

Elected Members
Electoral Responsibility
General, Regional and Sectional Issues

Political Associations

Table 2 Comparison of Regional
Representation in NSW

Table 3 Primary Interests of NSW
Legislative Council Representatives

Map 1 Australian Colonies 1843

Map 2 Australian Colonies 1851



Secretary of State for the Colonies
Lord Stanley
William Gladstone
Earl Grey
Sir John Pakington
Duke of Newcastle
Sir George Grey
Sidney Herbert
Lord John Russell
Sir William Molesworth
Henry Labouchiere


Governor of New South Wales
Sir George Gipps
Sir Charles FitzRoy
also 1851-56 Governor General of Australia *
Sir William Denison
*Governors since 1825 used a council to advise them. As they had no Australian council and thought it unfair to use the NSW council which might prejudice the other colonies, both very properly declined to use this power other than for ceremonial visits.
































On the hustings

Husting erected in Macquarie Place Sydney for the Legislative Council 1854 election.





























Competitors for Power

Sir George Gipps

‘unbending autocrat'
' uncanny foresight’

Robert Lowe

‘friend of liberty'
' turnabout and wheelabout’

W.C. Wentworth

‘patriot to his country'
' guided by self interest’









































































































































































































































Chapter 3


Elected Members

Whilst the constitutions of 1842 and 1850 determined the qualification levels for electors and members for the blended Legislative Council, the determination of electorates resided initially with the old nominated council and subsequently the blended one 1. The electoral franchise was first heralded as so low as to exclude only the most improvident 2 but, when combined with a carefully planned imbalance of urban and rural electorate voting quotas, any democratic potential was neutralised. So as this gerrymander elected a predominantly rural aristocracy which legislated for succeeding electoral acts, the gross imbalance was perpetuated until the bicameral responsible government era gradually allowed progressive redress. The product of the electoral distribution illustrated in Table 2 had a strong overriding effect on the political developments within the Colony.

Table 2 Comparison of Regional Representation in NSW 1845- l855

Towns & Boroughs

Note 1. Figures are rounded. For 1843 and 1848 they are inferred from 1841 and l846 censuses, and will be understated.

Apart from the property qualification of £2,000 or annual £100 income 4, factors which helped to isolate potential legislative council members were the honorary nature of the position, its heavy demands on the time of the conscientious, its prestige, and the opportunity to further personal interests and leanings. But above all there were the eternal political drawcards of a share of power and a chance of pre-eminence. However, there were also negative factors: with all the positive ones set in favour of a timocracy, there were both overt and subtle pressures against the not so respectable. As Robert Cooper quickly discovered, new money coupled with an emancipist past scandalised the opinion makers, who were really equally apprehensive of his chances of success. Irish Roman Catholics in Sydney and Melbourne offered and received violence in pressing their champions’ causes, only to lose out to protestant reaction. And although the gentlemanly emancipist Dr Bland was accepted politically, he was unwelcome on the University Senate. Even as late as the eve of responsible government, Daniel Deniehy’s Irish catholic and convict parent background threatened his political career 5. For all the conservative apprehensions on the insignificance of the franchise qualification, the majority plainly placed more trust in the best people as their elected representatives.

The end product of the elections held under the electoral rules generated by the self-perpetuating timocratic majority from 1843 to 1856 was inevitably a resounding victory for property interests. More specifically it favoured landed property interests, which became increasingly centred on the squatters 6. Any attempt to categorise members according to their economic position is complicated by the trend of successful property owners, particularly those who survived the drought and depression insolvencies of the early 1840s, to extend their interests across townhouses, merchant ventures, freehold property and leaseholds, and the reverse situation with those successful in commerce. However, taking their principal source of livelihood as a basis, the composition of the Legislative Council elected representatives after the 1843, 1848 and 1851 elections was as shown in Table 3.

Table 3 - Primary Interests of NSW Legislative Council Representatives after the 1843, 1848 and 1851 Elections 7

Primary Interests

Public Service








Electoral Responsibility

A member’s responsibility to his electorate was not at all clear cut. With up to five years between elections, elected representatives were under no immediate pressure to pander to their electors, yet Gipps was able to characterise them as ‘higgling and bargaining for the greatest share which he can get for his own constituents’  8. This is understandable enough in the long established tradition of the pork barrel in politics, but on less straightforward matters the honourable members saw their obligations in a considerably different light. Edmund Burke had codified a strong theory of electoral responsibility in asserting the overriding responsibility of an elected member to represent his constituents by voting according to his own opinions 9 – a comfortably indirect way of avoiding democratic excesses which could assuage conservative misgivings of widened electoral franchises. Wentworth, also a man determined that popular urgings should not gain ascendancy over the legitimate primacy of interests, was an unequivocal supporter of a member being ‘sent there by his constituents as one of the representatives of the colony to vote according to his conscience’ 10, and of keeping politicians free from the influence of the Sydney mob 11. This epitomised the conventional political wisdom in the colony 12, with only a few whose place in the legislature and personal support depended on their adoption of publicly populist stances.

Elections, however, did bring a time of accounting, although this could as much be connected with a candidate’s stance on current points of issue as on past performance. Lowe, as strong supporter of the squatting interest against Gipps’ land regulations and quit rent enforcement, was acceptable enough in St Vincent and Auckland even although his stance on other issues had a mixed reception, but by the 1848 election, his swing against the landed interests instigated a sufficiently strong electoral threat to encourage his move to a Sydney seat 13. Similarly Wentworth felt the urban voting chill over his support of pastoral interests, barely holding third place in the 1851 Sydney poll 14. Irate citizens promised the Legislative Council an electoral backlash over its continued support of transportation in 1846 15, but with three quarters of the elected seats dependent on rural electors, and the Legislative Council position determined on the support of those rural representatives, there was not much to threaten about; the urban representatives who might be vulnerable had either been absent or done their duty by voting to call the house against the measure. Nonetheless the uproar certainly influenced the Council to set the pro-transportation select committee report aside before the next election 16.

Some issues had to be supported by members as an act of faith: separation and financial equity for Port Phillip District 17, land tenure 18 for pastoral districts, and anti-transportation for urban electorates 19. For the rest, candidates seemed determined to avoid specifics, presenting themselves as reliable representatives who could be trusted to pursue colonial responsibility and adopt the right course in the legislature 20. Independence from the taint of government associations was preferred – even to the extent of drawing early suggestions to elect only those who would oppose the government 21. The few government employees who were elected – Therry, Young and Mitchell – were pressured into supporting government measures and consequently did not remain long. Nor did the majority of private members serve for extended periods 22. The problems of political survival therefore devolved on a comparatively small core of serious politicians who, rather than tailor their attitudes to their electorates, sought electorates which could accept their attitudes. In particular, the increasingly intense struggle for the urban seats by less orthodox politicians, and the entrenchment of well known members in county and pastoral seats points to the establishment of long term politicians in electorates which were strongly attuned to their interests. By the beginning of the responsible government period some stability had emerged: the 1856 elections saw the defeat of only six sitting members, and these were for rural electorates 23.

General, Regional and Sectional Issues

In terms of Legislative Council political attitudes, the major enduring issues were all facets of the one central area of contention: power. That is not to say that there were not continuing emotive issues such as education, temperance, religion, public works, security and legal matters 24 which generated strong divisions and absorbed much of the Council's time. But so many other significant areas of contention involved the root issue of dispute: who controlled Colonial finances, lands, laws and patronage? As much as the Colonial Office could point to an alleged significant devolution of power in these matters under the 1843 and 1850 Constitutions 25, ultimate sanctions remained with the imperial power. In addition, the authority which was vested in the colonial administration, governor and executive effectively withheld the colony's resources and offices from its elected representatives' authority 26, other than in a negative or spoiling way. Peripheral to the points of principle on colonial political responsibility lay the vast bulk of concerns and aggravations which sparked confrontations of representatives with governor and colonial office and between themselves.

As well as responsible government being the most pervasive political issue in New South Wales, its universality was matched only by the variety and imprecision of perceptions on the nature of the responsibility so ardently desired. This variety involved not only a conceptual range at any particular time, but also a change of these perceptions as time progressed. Part of the variation was due to imprecision of expression; part was due to proponents adjusting their approach to pursuit of changes in interests; and part to progress of development of the Canadian model 27. It was not until the early 1850s, when the realisation of that constitutional goal was assured, that there was general recognition that responsibility meant not just an elected ministerial system, but a group of ministers who would work in combination and would need to maintain collectively the confidence of the elected representatives 28.

This development involved a considerable change from the approach early in the blended council's activities, where individual areas of dispute were dominant factors in the demand for local responsibility, and the tussle to gain control of local resources was paramount. Members were more interested and willing to dictate how the government should handle local affairs under the guise of local responsibility than in establishing the cohesive political understandings and agreement which could support real responsibility 29. So Gipps was able to criticise elected members as irresponsible, in particular by comparison with the model of British responsible government, where the opposition had the desire and expectations of carrying out its proclaimed measures in government. Such a criticism was only halfway valid, as the constitution of New South Wales placed government firmly and inalienably in the hands of governor and executive, and it would be expecting too much of the elected opposition to act as an alternative government without any foreseeable expectation of achieving such responsibility. Their political approaches and alignments continued in that vein even beyond the construction of the responsible constitution bills in 1852-3 until the election of the responsible House of Assembly in 1856 brought the realization of power and reponsibility into focus 30.

Initial disputation on local responsibility therefore turned on issues. The Civil List, providing financial independence for governor and his government, was readily identifiable as taxation without representation 31. Other aspects involving financial implications radiated from that issue – the cost of goals, police, district councils, land revenues, immigration, duties and the governor's monopoly on money bills 32. To cap these injustices there remained the governor's powers of reservation of legislation; the totality of these restrictions left little doubt to political activists that any real power which had been transferred from Westminster to Sydney had simply been given to Westminster's local representative. With no constitutional relief in sight, opposition hardened against that symbol and agent of imperial domination, an opposition which sought to stretch the constitution in its own favour and was prepared to combine on other' issues in which there might otherwise have been much less unanimity.

This so called 'anti-Gipps alliance' 33 consequently provided an umbrella which subsumed essentially sectional issues into general ones. Squatting interests were able to rally behind them widespread support against Gipps' well intentioned, if heavy handed, attempt to forestall perpetual alienation of most of the Colony's pastoral land. District councils, as potential taxers of landowners and voters, drew similar heat and unity of opposition 34. Even in the unity of opinion that the long standing education problem needed resolution, there was diversity of opinion on how this should be resolved – yet another issue in which potentially enlightened administrative action could only alienate a vocal section of the community 35. Added to this, the natural cost-cutting propensities of a majority of council members, who were also taxpayers and representatives of taxpaying interests, could be given added respectability and support when turned against governor and his administration. The new found spirit of cooperation which followed the squatters' success and installation of FitzRoy as governor diverted the immediate struggle for responsibility into a struggle for political control amongst squatting, landed and urban interests. The cooling of the responsibility issue on which J M Ward remarks 36, which was also manifested in the strong reaction to Lord Grey's attempt to impose a complex collegiate tricameral system on the Colony 37, was basically a manifestation of the internal contestants being unwilling to accept changes which did not meet their objectives. Grey's response of delegation of initiation of change to the colonial legislature brought the dissension to the surface once more.

In societies dominated by ruling propertied interests, those interests have always feared the spectre of democracy. Immigration and the gold rush of the late 1840s and early 1850s provided an influx of the 'lower orders’ 38 which gave an urgency to their control which had not existed earlier. While the Mutual Protection Society of Workers in 1844 could boast of no more than 500 adherents, the mass rallies of the anti-transportation movements and Constitution Bill opposition 39 were a clear and present danger to the establishment. Conservative reaction by the Wentworth, Macarthur and Thomson groups was manifested in attempts to institutionalise oligarchic control in restricted franchise, an aristocratic upper house and control of constitutional change 40. In contrast, pragmatists of the Cowper persuasion, followed by new found allies whom he branded as opportunists – Donaldson, Nichols and Martin 41, sought compromise or at least avoidance of conflict with the Parkes and Lang radicals to gain both a growing source of electoral power and the means to control the source. But using the 'Sydney mob' for political and sectional ends had its other side – the masses once mobilised do not necessarily restrain themselves to convenient issues. Realist politicians, as much as most denied democratic or demagogic inclinations 42, were obliged to recognise the longer term futility of attempts at containment and seek to subsume popular aspirations within liberalised political objectives. As the immigrants had come to the Colony to better themselves, they were very susceptible to the appeal of' middle class objectives to which they might themselves aspire. It was a shrewd and successful approach 43.

Regional issues of financial control and separation were basically aspects of the responsibility question in local dress. What the Colonial Office was not prepared to grant to New South Wales, the Central Districts representatives were not prepared to grant to Port Phillip and Moreton Bay 44. The motivations were different in Sydney to those in London, and those in the Southern and Northern Districts were spiced with competitiveness and squatting self interest respectively 45; so much so that each was prepared to forego colonial responsibility temporarily in order to achieve separation. Local issues could generate just as much interest and heat as is evidenced by the extent of activity in select committees, legislation, Council debate and newspaper editorialising and correspondence. But until New South Wales had both political responsibility rather than self government, and had expanded representation to the bulk of its inhabitants, a high proportion of political effort was diverted into opposition rather than constructive policy making.

Committees and Petitions

The incidence of select committees was extremely high by any standards. In an unpaid legislature, with no perquisites attaching to committee membership, Legislative Council members showed an unusual propensity to both appoint and serve on select committees. The exact number of committees is open to interpretation as some were reappointed; the total in the sessions 1843 to 1855 was 322 46, and although the more prominent and active members dominated their membership and chairmanship, few members whose term in the council exceeded a nominal period failed to participate. In addition to the expected predominance of elected members, it is notable that official nominees were routinely members, if only to influence the findings; their absence was the exception – in committees which were blatantly directed against governor or government.

Select committees filled a variety of purposes. Council members were not professional politicians, having either official duties, professional or mercantile employment, or estates to supervise. Although, as a consequence, sessions and sittings were limited by season, frequency and duration 47, absenteeism was reasonably commonplace 48. Committees were therefore able to make up for members' lack of knowledge, research facilities and time by providing summaries of evidence and draft proposals for action. The capacity of the public service to handle these tasks was not extensive, nor would elected members necessarily be satisfied that advice emanating from the executive could be accepted as representing colonial or their own interests. There was also the bonus of involving interested parties in the Council's decision making process, which gave added moral weight to proponents of measures arising from committee reports. For the activists who expended so much time and effort in committee work, there were the benefits of prestige, kudos with constituents and the ability to use the reports as a vehicle to extend their influence in the legislature. For the Council generally, it was an effective and economical way of investigating problems and preparing detailed courses of action in matters which the Executive had no intention or interest in taking an initiative. The 1842 Constitution ended the Executive's virtual monopoly on introducing legislation; the select committee, which had been employed sparingly up to 1843, gave the non-official members as a group the capacity to use that avenue of extending their control over colonial affairs.

Another extensive vehicle to influence the executive and fellow representatives, as well as perform a duty for their constituents, was in the presentation of petitions. These were presented regularly and in volume. Many were single petitioner requests for redress of administrative error or injustice. Others related to local area problems or demands. The most notable impinged on regional issues – separation and anti-separation demands for Port Phillip and Moreton Bay Districts 49; protests against the introduction of district councils 50; and the greatest and most continuous one against transportation, which culminated in an overwhelming 35,000 signatures against to 500 for its continuation in 1850 51, effectively putting an end to Council vacillation on the issue. Although petitions have grown to be valueless in modern parliamentary currency, their value as an avenue of remedying inequity and of influencing the legislature in a substantially undemocratic society 52 was considerable. Whilst the select committee favoured the established members of the community in influencing their legislators, petitions were open to all levels and provided members with both opportunity and obligation to meet electoral and wider community responsibilities.

Political Associations

Political associations have always been a feature of societies in which they have not developed into the infrastructure of political parties. New South Wales had them before, during and after the blended council period. They functioned variously to consolidate support on grievances, lobby for sectional, regional and colonial issues, represent class interests and provide support for the election of members who it was imagined would represent the group's interests. Some were extremely limited in purpose. The Petition Society was primarily a counter to the Patriotic Association's constitutional efforts 53; the Mutual Protection Society an embryonic working class association to preserve its interests, against competition from imported workers and goods 54; and the anti-transportation leagues and associations, extensive and enthusiastic as they became, disappeared when their primary objective was met 55.

Greater depth existed in the Constitutional Association, the Australian League and the New South Wales Political Association 56, which attracted widespread support on populist issues of franchise extension, closer settlement, social justice and colonial nationalism and responsibility. Support and survival of a more radical press in the form of Bell's Life in Sydney, Peoples Advocate and Empire gave wider voice to these more radical movements, which also provided electoral support for Lang, Parkes, Wilshire and Michie, with mixed success. But there was a limit to how far they could go before they became politically counter-productive through the suspicions aroused by radical societies in the aftermath of the 1848 European revolutions. Parkes found it necessary to deny that he was an extremist or that the Constitutional Association was a secret society 57; he did not join the Political Association to avoid being labelled as a democrat, radical and republican which were equated with revolutionary inclinations. Aspiring populist politicians had a fine line to draw between popular support and the immigrant mob of Sydney 58.

These limitations contributed substantially to the failure of the various associations to develop into a basis for political party. Their platforms were at worst singular, at best too narrow and sectionally oriented to provide a political base for any more than a very few members in an electorate gerrymandered to rural and property interests. Although they provided political backing, acted as ginger groups to government and representatives or provided a centrepoint for mass grievances, they lacked the durability and depth to fulfil more than those roles. They represented yet another manifestation of the politics of the colonies being based on issues rather than any coherent and comprehensive philosophies or policies.

There were even looser political groupings which were perceived as existing at various periods. The 'anti-Gipps alliance' was previously mentioned 59. The squatting interest and its Pastoral Association was clearly its centre and when that interest had achieved its basic aims and generally fallen in behind the government, a counter move developed behind Robert Lowe’s attempt to prevent squatter entrenchment and domination. This now small group, labelled the Constitutionists 60, became the residual opposition, but was neither a formal association nor a constant group with a developed philosophy or programme. It received commercial support on restraint of expenditure, and working class support in the mistaken belief that Lowe had democratic inclinations 61. Apart from its liberal approach, this opposition pursued a variety of personal inclinations, and voted accordingly in the Council.

Even more ephemeral connections existed in family relationships: the Macarthurs' connection with Deas Thomson, son in law of ex-Governor Bourke, and marriage relationships with chairman of committees Parker. The connections spread further through the gentry of the Colony. Thomson wielded increasing power, especially during FizRoy's tenure as governor 62 and the Macarthurs had some influence amongst the 'independent gentlemen' in the Council. This seems to have had some effect in consolidating voting support for the government, but it is very obvious from the voting patterns over a decade that this did not extend to creating an establishment which would effectively control the colonial executive, legislative majority and patronage after the North American 'family compact' model. Liberal governors, activists such as Wentworth, Lowe and Cowper, and the outer-social squatting interests prevented such an association developing. Its main effects appear to have been in the provision of electoral support for family, friends and associates 63. Again, these associates were not united in any cohesive political policies but rather were expected as 'independent gentlemen' to follow generally the dictates of their class.



Acronyms and Abbreviations

1. 5&6 Vic cLXXVI s4; 13&l4 Vic cLIX s3.

2. Australian 12 October 1842, p2 Editorial; Sydney Morning Herald 28 December 1842, p2 Election.

3. R. Mansfield Analytical View of the Census of New South Wales for the Year 1841, 1846 Sydney 1841, p25; 1847, p13, 15; V&P NSW LC (1844) vol II Select Committee on the Electoral Franchise, p 2; V&P NSW LC (1851) Vol I, p125.

4. 5&6 Vic, cLCCVI s4.

5. Molony Architect of Freedom p45, 74; C.M.H. Clark, History of Australia vol III Melbourne 1973, p287-8; Pearl Brilliant Daniel Deniehy p46.

6. HRA I.XXIV, p250 Gipps to Stanley of 13 February 1845.

7. Australian Dictionary of Biography vols 1-6 passim; various other major references listed in the Bibliography.

8. HRA I.XXIV, p252 Gipps to Stanley of 13 February 1845.

9. Burke Works vol 2, pp 377, 380, 382, 421.

10. Sydney Morning Herald 10 August 1844, p3 Legislative Council.

11. E.K. Silvester (ed) Selected Speeches Sydney 1853, p 25.

12. See also Martin and Macarthur in Silvester Selected Speeches p78,137.

13. Atlas 8 July 1848, p329 Representation of Sydney.

14. A.W. Martin Henry Parkes Melbourne 1980, p105.

15. Knight Illiberal Liberal p166.

16. V&P NSW LC (1846) 23 October 1846; (1847) 14 September 1847.

17. Port Phillip Patriot 15 June 1943, p2 Editorial; HRA I.XXIV, p193-4 Enclosure to Gipps to Stanley of 12 January 1845.

18. Roe Quest for Authority p63-4.

19. The transportation stance was, however, a ‘hygiene’ factor rather than a vote catcher (Knight Illiberal Liberal p201, 217).

20. Sydney Morning Herald 4 March 1843, p1; 12 July 1848, p1; 4 August 1851, p1; also subsequent issues in each period. Speeches reported from the hustings were sometimes more comprehensive and specific, but certainly longer.

21. HRA I.XXIII, p199 Gipps t Stanley of 28 October 1843 (No 174); Port Phillip Patriot 1 April 1844, p2 Editorial; Sydney Morning Herald 15 February 1843, p2 Editorial.

22. Of 87 elected members in the period, 14 could be classed as long term. Dumaresq, Murray, Nicholson, Suttor, Wentworth and (with short breaks) W. Bowman and Cowper served through the three Council terms; Darvall, Donaldson, Fitzgerald, Macarthur, Martin, Nichols and Oakes served the last two terms; another dozen saw the final term through.

23. Empire 3 May 1856, p4 Legislative Assembly.

24. A comprehensive overview of the issues is provided by the select committees appointed: summarised in the V&P NSW LC for 1844 to 1855, with reports printed in all years 1843 to 1855.

25. HRA I.XXII, p243 Stanley to Gipps of 5 September 1842; V&P NSW LC (1851) vol I Grey to FitzRoy of 30 August 1850.

26. V&P NSW LC (1844) vol II Report from the Select Committee on General Grievances p15; (1851) vol II, p145-6 Report from the Select Committee on the New Constitution.

27. T.H. Irving ‘The Idea of Responsible Government in New South Wales Before 1856’ HS vol 12 No 42 (1964) pp 196-7, 200.

28. cit. pp 202-4.

29. Knight Illiberal Liberal p50-53.

30. Empire 24 April 1856, p4 Editorial emphasised the difference between the appointed administrative executive and the new ministers who would survive on the basis of avowed policy.

31. Sydney Morning Herald 13 March 1843, p2 Durham Election.

32. V&P NSW LC (1844) vol II Report From the Select Committee on General Grievances, p15; Report from the Select Committee on Crown Land Grievances, p16-18.

33. K. Buckley ‘Gipps and the Graziers of New South Wales 1844-6’ HS vol 6 No 24 (1955) p411.

34. Sydney Morning Herald 26 July 1844, p2-3 Legislative Council.

35. Knight Illiberal Liberal p90-1.

36. Ward James Macarthur p177-8.

37. PP (1849) XXXV, p37.

38. C.M.H. Clark Select Documents in Australian History 1788-1850 Sydney 1950, p214.

39. Roe Quest for Authority p93; Knight Illiberal Liberal p219-221; Martin Henry Parkes p116-17.

40. Ward James Macarthur p181, 191-2.

41. Powell Patrician Democrat p59.

42. Empire 10 April 1851, p298 Patriotism; Powell Patrician Democrat, p53.

43. R.W. Connell & T.H. Irving Class Structure in Australian History Melbourne 1980, p115-6.

44. V&P NSW LC (1844) 20 August 1844; (1853) vol II, pl117f sLII.

45. CO 201/372 Cunningham to Grey of 8 July, 10 August 1844 (AJCP PRO 376 f313); Port Phillip Patriot 30 March 1843, p2 Editorial, p3 Mortimer; CO 201/439 Enclosures 1,2,4 to FitzRoy to Grey of 27 January 1851 (AJCP PRO 627 ff 78-80, 83-88).

46. Molony Architect of Freedom p51.

47. Mid-afternoon sittings were normal, for an average 70 day session covering about half the year, either ending in time for shearing or suffering in attendance accordingly (Sydney Morning Herald 26 February 1846, p3 Legislative Council).

48. Surprisingly there were few failures of quorum, averaging fewer than three per year although some years are observably worse, particularly where sittings extended into late in the year.

49. HRA I.XXIV, p190 Enclosure to Gipps to Stanley of 12 January 1845; CO 201/439 Enclosures 1,2,4 to FitzRoy to Grey of 29 January 1851 (AJCP PRO 627 ff 78-80, 83-88); CO 201/440 Enclosures to FitzRoy to Grey of 4 April 1851 (AJCP PRO 628 f210, 212).

50. HRA I.XXIV, p250 Gipps to Stanley of 13 February 1845; PP (1849) XXXV, p40.

51. V&P NSW LC (1850) vol II, p585.

52. Under the liberalised franchise of 1851, 17,025 qualified as electors out of a population of 192,000, an adult franchise of perhaps 40 percent (V&P NSW LC (1851) vol II) p124).

53. Sydney Morning Herald 20 February 1843, p2 Editorial.

54. Guardian 16 March 1844, pp 1-2 The Association; Sydney Morning Herald 7 February 1844, p2 Public Meeting; 8 February 1844, p2 Editorial.

55. Ward Earl Grey and the Australian Colonies p217.

56. Peoples Advocate 2 December 1848, p6 Constitutional Association; Sydney Morning Herald 30 April l850 p1 Australian League; 27 March 1851, p243-4 Pub1ic Meeting.

57. Martin Henry Parkes p61, 109, 117.

58. Knight Illiberal Liberal p210; Powell Patrician Democrat p53.

59. See Note 33 above.

60. Maitland Mercury 28 March 1846, p2 Mr Windeyer; cf Atlas 7 February 1846, p1 Squatting Politics.

61. Knight Illiberal Liberal p210-3.

62. Foster Colonial Improver p67, 92.

63. Ward James Macarthur p127, 151-4, 206, 308-9; Forest ‘Political Divisions’ p468.